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Abstract
This paper provides a thorough economic evaluation of the anti-drug policies
implemented in Colombia between 2000 and 2006 under the so-called Plan Colombia.
The paper develops a game theory model of the war against illegal drugs in producer
countries. We explicitly model illegal drug markets, which allows us to account for the
feedback eﬀects between policies and market outcomes that are potentially important
when evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia.W ec a l i b r a t e
the model using available data for the war on cocaine production and traﬃcking as
well as outcomes from the cocaine markets. Using the results from the calibration
we estimate important measures of the costs, eﬀectiveness, and eﬃciency of the war
on drugs in Colombia. Finally we assess the impact of increases in the U.S. budget
allocated to Plan Colombia,a n dﬁnd that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget
allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine
reaching consumer countries by about 15%.
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11 Introduction
Despite the large amount of resources spent over the current decade on the so-called “war
on drugs” in cocaine consumer and producer countries,1 most available measures show that
consumption trends have not shown any decreasing tendency, nor have prices increased
signiﬁcantly2. On the one hand, “there is increasing acceptance that the fundamental
problem for rich countries is their inability to control domestic demand for drugs”; on the
other, “the search for ways of controlling production (and traﬃcking) continues, with rich
countries both aiding and coercing poor producer nations in their eﬀorts.” (Reuter, 2008,
p. 1).
In Colombia, where about 70% of the cocaine consumed in the world is produced, the
U.S. and the Colombian governments have allocated large amounts of resources to the war
on drugs during the current decade under Plan Colombia3. According to the Colombian
National Planning Department (DNP), between 2000 and 2005, the U.S. government dis-
bursed about $3.8 billion in subsidies to the Colombian government for its war against
illegal drug producers and traﬃckers. Colombia for its part spent about $6.9 billion during
the same period. About one half of Colombian expenses (about $3.4 billion) and about
three quarters of U.S. subsidies (about $2.8 billion) have gone directly to the military
components of the war against drug production, traﬃcking, and the organized criminal
1According to the Oﬃce for National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP, 2007, Table 1), the U.S. Federal
Government alone spent approximately $12.5 billion per year between 2005 and 2007 on the war on drugs.
Slightly more than 60% of this budget was spent on policies aimed at reducing the supply of drugs (i.e.
law enforcement, interdiction and subsidies for the war on drugs in producer countries), and slightly less
than 40% on policies aimed at reducing the demand for drugs (i.e. treatment and prevention policies).
Colombia, the main cocaine producer country in the world, has spent about $1 billion per year for the last
7 years on the war on drugs and in combatting the organized criminal organizations associated with illegal
drug production and traﬃcking (see DNP, 2006).
2Mejía and Posada (2008) provide a thorough description of the main stylized facts of the cocaine
markets, both in producer and consumer countries. One of the main stylized facts is that despite the
recent intensiﬁcation of the war on cocaine, market prices at the wholesale and retail levels have remained
relatively stable during the last 7 years, and consumption trends do not show any decresing tendency. See
also the evidence cited in Caulkins and Hao (2008, p. 253), as well as the United Nations Oﬃce for Drug
and Crime (UNODC) yearly reports.
3Plan Colombia is the oﬃcial name of a program that, among other things, provides the institutional
framework for the military alliance between the U.S. and Colombia in the war against illegal drug produc-
tion, traﬃcking, and the organized criminal groups associated with these activities.
2organizations associated with these activities (DNP, 2006). Nevertheless, most available
data show that the availability of cocaine in consumer countries has not gone down signif-
icantly, nor has the price of cocaine shown any increasing tendency, as might have been
anticipated given the intensiﬁcation of this war (see Mejía and Posada, 2008). While the
number of hectares of coca crops cultivated in Colombia has decreased by about half (from
about 163,000 hectares in 2000 to about 80,000 hectares in 2006) mostly as a result of aerial
eradication campaigns, potential cocaine production in Colombia has only decreased from
687,000 kg per year in 2000 (right before Plan Colombia w a si n i t i a t e d )t oa b o u t6 1 0 , 0 0 0k g
per year in 2006. This apparently paradoxical outcome - that is, the large decrease in the
cultivation of the coca crops necessary to produce cocaine chlorhydrate, the relatively small
decrease in potential cocaine production, and the relatively stable trend in the wholesale
and retail prices for cocaine - can be explained, to a large extent, by a signiﬁcant increase in
the yields per hectare resulting from the adoption of certain measures aimed at increasing
the productivity in the production of cocaine.4 These increases in productivity have taken
many diﬀerent forms. Among others, the use of stronger and bigger coca plants, a higher
density of coca plants per hectare, better planting techniques, the use of coca plants that
have been modiﬁed to make them resistant to the active ingredients of the herbicide used
in aerial eradication campaigns,5 and the spraying of coca plants with molasses in order
to prevent the active component of the herbicides used in the eradication campaigns from
destroying the leaves of the coca plants. There is also evidence that illegal drug producers
intermingle coca plants with legal crops in order to avoid the aerial eradication campaigns;
likewise, the illegal drug producers have reduced the size of coca plantations in order to
avoid their being detected by satellite images used to detect illegal crops. As a result of
these strategic responses to the intense eradication campaigns implemented under Plan
Colombia, drug producers in Colombia have found ways to increase the yields per hectare
from about 4.3 kg of cocaine per hectare per year in 2000 to more than 7.7 kg of cocaine
per hectare per year in 2006. Thus, cocaine production in 2006 was almost the same as in
4Caulkins and Hao (2008) provide an alternative explanatuion for this apparently paradoxical result.
Namely, they argue that reductions in source country supply would aﬀect diﬀerent downstream markets in
diﬀerent ways depending on each market’s elasticity of demand for exports. However, for the case of the war
on drugs in Colombia, the large reductions observed in coca cultivation have not directly translated into
reductions in the supply of cocaine, as drug producers have responded strategically to the aerial eradication
campaigns by increasing the yields per hectare of land cultivated with coca crops.
5McDermott (2004).
32000, right before Plan Colombia was initiated. The large productivity increases induced
by the endogenous strategic responses of drug producers as described above are not sur-
prising once one looks at the proﬁt margins associated with the production and traﬃcking
of cocaine: in consumer countries, at the retail level, a pure gram of cocaine is worth as
much as ten times its weight in gold; in producer countries, however, the same gram is
worth, on average, only slightly more than one tenth its weight in gold.
With the above stylized facts in mind, the general impression is that programs aimed
at reducing the production and traﬃcking of illegal drugs have proved to be relatively
ineﬀective in reducing the amount of drugs reaching consumer countries. For instance,
a recent report by the U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce (GAO) recognizes that al-
though security in Colombia has improved signiﬁcantly during the current decade, the drug
reduction goals of Plan Colombia6 were, after almost 6 years of its implementation, not
fully met. However, and despite the large amount of resources spent by Colombia and the
U.S. during the current decade, little of a systematic nature is known about the eﬀects,
costs, and eﬃciency of the anti-drug policies implemented under Plan Colombia7.I ns h o r t ,
the main objective of this paper is to ﬁll this gap.
In this paper, we construct a model of the war against illegal drug production and traf-
ﬁcking which incorporates strategic interactions between the actors involved. We explicitly
m o d e li l l e g a ld r u gm a r k e t s ,i nt h ep r o d u c e rand the consumer countries, which allows us
to account for the feedback eﬀects between policies, market outcomes, and the strategic
responses of the actors involved that are potentially important when evaluating such large-
scale policy interventions as Plan Colombia. Importantly, we use data from the war on
drugs in Colombia (before and after Plan Colombia) as well as the observed outcomes from
the cocaine markets in order to calibrate the unobservable parameters of the model. We
then use the results from the calibration exercise to estimate important variables that are
relevant for policy purposes. Among others, we estimate variables such as the marginal
cost, both for the U.S. government and for Colombia, of reducing the supply of cocaine
in consumer countries by 1 kilogram, the elasticity of cocaine reaching consumer countries
to changes in the U.S. budget allocated to the war against illegal drug production and
traﬃcking in Colombia, the relative eﬀectiveness of the resources allocated by the Colom-
6The ﬁrst goal of Plan Colombia was to reduce the cultivation, processing, and distribution of illicit
narcotics in Colombia by 50 percent over a 6-year period (starting in 2000).
7See Caulkins (2004), Reuter (2008), and Mejía and Posada (2008).
4bian government to the war on illegal drugs, and the costs to the Colombian government
arising from the production and traﬃcking of cocaine. The results from the calibration of
the model are then used to carry out simulation exercises, wherein we assess the eﬀects of
increasing the U.S. and Colombian budgets allocated to the war against cocaine production
and traﬃcking, ﬁnding, among many other things, that a three-fold increase in the U.S.
budget allocated to Plan Colombia would decrease the amount of cocaine reaching con-
sumer countries by about 15%. We also estimate that the elasticity of the cocaine reaching
consumer countries with respect to changes in the amount of resources invested in the war
against drug production is about 0.017%; and with respect to changes in the amount of re-
sources invested in the war against drug traﬃcking is about 0.1%. Based on the theoretical
model as well as the calibration results, we identify the key fundamentals that are behind
the high costs/low eﬀectiveness of the war on drugs in producer countries, as seen by the
very low responsiveness of cocaine reaching consumer countries to changes in the amount
of money allocated to the two fronts of the war on drugs. The main factors behind the low
eﬀectiveness of the war against illegal drug production and traﬃcking are: a low elasticity
of demand for drugs (as identiﬁed also by Becker et al., 2006); a low relative eﬀectiveness
of the resources invested in the two fronts of the war on drugs (vis-à-vis the eﬀectiveness of
the resources invested by the drug producers and the drug traﬃckers); and a low relative
importance in the production and traﬃcking technologies of the factors being targeted by
the two fronts of the war on drugs (land in the case of the war against illegal drug produc-
tion and the drug routes in the case of the war against illegal drug traﬃcking). Finally,
we identify an asymmetry between the producer and consumer countries’ preferred means
used in the ﬁght against illegal drugs. More precisely, while both (producer and consumer
countries) have an interest in ﬁghting the war on drugs, the former would prefer to ﬁght
only against illegal drug production whereas the latter would prefer to ﬁght only against
illegal drug traﬃcking. When we let the data tell us how resources have been allocated, we
ﬁnd that both activities, illegal drug production and traﬃcking, have been targeted by Plan
Colombia. This asymmetry has lead, according to our results, to an apparent ineﬃciency
from the perspective of each country separately in the allocation of resources between the
two fronts of the war against illegal drugs in producer countries.
Most of the available literature on the eﬀects of anti-drug policies has focused on partial
equilibrium analysis.8 However, the market for illegal drugs hides complex interactions that
8See Rydell et al. (1996) and Tragler et. al (2001) for partial equilibrium studies on the trade-oﬀ
5should be addressed using models that can account for the feedback eﬀects between policies,
prices, and the consequent strategic reactions of the actors involved in this war, specially
when one is evaluating large scale policy interventions such as Plan Colombia. Important
exceptions are Chumacero (2008), Costa-Storti and De Grauwe (2008), and Mejía (2008).
These papers explicitly model illegal drug markets when analyzing the eﬀects of anti-drug
policies. While the focus of Chumacero (2008) is on the eﬀects of three alternative anti-
drug policies (making illegal activities riskier, increasing the penalties to illegal activities,
and legalization), Costa-Storti and De Grauwe (2008) and Mejía (2008) focus on the inter-
relationship between anti-drug policies aimed at reducing the demand for drugs (such as
treatment and prevention policies in consumer countries) and policies aimed at reducing
the supply of drugs (by means of interdiction and increased enforcement).9 However, none
of these contributions focuses on evaluating the costs, eﬀectiveness, and future prospects
of the war on illegal drugs, as this paper does, nor are they aimed at evaluating actual
anti-drug policies, as this paper is.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 presents the model; section 3 contains
the calibration strategy, results, robustness checks, as well as the results from the simula-
tions; section 4 discusses the key factors that make the war against illegal drug production
and traﬃcking more costly/less eﬀective, together with other interesting results; section 5
concludes.
2 The Model
We model the war against drug production and traﬃcking as a sequential game, in which
there are 4+n actors involved. These actors are the government of the drug produc-
ing country (henceforth the government), the government of the drug consumer country
(henceforth the interested outsider), the drug traﬃcker, a wholesale buyer who is located
at the border of the consumer country, and n illegal drug producers.
between treatment vs. enforcement policies in reducing the consumption of illegal drugs. Grossman and
Mejía (2008) study the relative eﬃciency and eﬀectiveness of eradication and interdiction eﬀorts in a partial
equilibrium game theory model. For a thorough survey of the literature on the eﬀects of source country
control interventions and the eﬀects of treatment and prevention policies in reducing the demand for illegal
drugs, see Caulkins (2004).
9Costa-Storti and De Grauwe (2008) also address the issue of how globalization has reduced the retail
price of illegal drugs during the last few decades, thus stimulating consumption.
6We assume that the government faces a net cost per unit of income that drug producers
are able to obtain from illegal drug production; additionally, that it also faces a (perhaps
diﬀerent) net cost per unit of income that the drug traﬃcker is able to obtain from illegal
drug traﬃcking.10 We also assume that the interested outsider grants the military forces of
the government two types of subsidies in an attempt to strengthen their resolve in the war
against illegal drug production and against illegal drug traﬃcking. These subsidies consist
of a fraction (1 − ω) ∈ [0,1) of the resources that the government spends on the conﬂict
with drug producers over the control of land suitable for cultivating illegal crops, and a
fraction (1 − Ω) ∈ [0,1) of the resources that the government spends trying to interdict the
illegal drug shipments.
The war against drug production and traﬃcking proceeds as follows:
1. The interested outsider grants subsidies 1−ω and 1−Ω to strengthen the resolve of
the government in the war against illegal drug production and traﬃcking, respectively.
2. The government engages the n illegal drug producers in a conﬂict over the control
of arable land suitable for cultivating the crop necessary to produce the illegal drug. We
assume that, initially, there are n disjoint pieces of land of size L/n, each of which is
contested by each one of the n drug producers with the government. L denotes the total
land that can potentially be used for the cultivation of illicit crops.
3. The n drug producers ﬁght against each other over the control of the land that the
government does not control.
4. Once the illegal drug producers know how much land they control (that is, how
much raw material they have to produce illegal drugs), they have to decide the amount of
resources they invest in those factors that are complementary to land in the production
of illegal drugs, such as chemicals, workshops, and other materials necessary for their
production. Combining these complementary factors with the land they control, they are
able to produce illegal drugs.
5. At this stage of the game, the drug traﬃcker and the government engage in an
interdiction sub-game, whereby the government invests resources to try to detect the routes
used by the drug traﬃcker to transport illegal drugs, and the drug traﬃcker invests resources
10These costs need not be the same for many diﬀerent reasons. For instance, drug producers, as it is
the case in Colombia, ﬁnance their terrorist activities against the government (at least in part) from the
income they receive from illegal drug production. Drug traﬃckers, on the other hand, might use a diﬀerent
fraction of the proceeds from illegal drug traﬃcking to corrupt politicians, bribe the anti-narcotics police,
and so forth.
7in order to avoid being detected.
6. Once the drug traﬃcker knows the expected probability that a drug shipment will
survive the government’s interdiction eﬀorts (that is, the probability that a route will not
be detected), he has to decide how much illegal drugs to buy from the drug producers.
7. Finally, in the last stage of the game, the drug traﬃcker sells the illegal drugs that
survive the government’s interdiction eﬀorts at the border of the consumer country to a
wholesale drug dealer.
While the objective of drug producers and the drug traﬃcker is to maximize the proﬁts
from their activities (which are described in detail below), the government’s objective is to
minimize the costs associated with illegal drug production, traﬃcking, and the war against
these two activities. In turn, the interested outsider’s objective is to minimize the amount
of illegal drugs reaching the consumer country.
We now turn to a description of each one of the stages of the game described above,
wherein we describe in detail the problems faced by each agent involved in the game, their
objective functions and restrictions, as well as the production, conﬂict, and traﬃcking
technologies. As it is usual in the analysis of sequential games, we start with the last stage
of the game.
2.1 The demand for drugs at the border of the consumer country
In order to simplify the analysis that follows, and inasmuch as the main purpose of this
paper is to study the war on illegal drug production and traﬃcking,11 we assume that the
demand for drugs at the border of the consumer country is given by a general demand
function of the form:
11Mejia (2008) develops a model of the war on drugs in both consumer and producer countries, and
studies how anti-drug policies implemented in consumer countries aﬀect the eﬀectiveness of anti-drug
policies in producer countries. Speciﬁcally, the main argument in that paper is that those policies aimed
at reducing the demand for drugs in consumer countries (treatment and prevention policies) reduce the
price of illegal drugs, thus making anti-drug policies implemented in producer countries more eﬀective and
less costly; conversely, policies aimed at reducing the supply of drugs in consumer countries (enforcement,
stiﬀer penalties for dealers and consumers, etc.) render the policies implemented in producer countries less
eﬀective and more costly, as they increase the price of illegal drugs, as well as the incentive for more illegal









f denotes the demand for drugs, a ≥ 0 is a scale parameter of the demand
function, Pf is the wholesale price of the illegal drug at the border of the consumer country,
and b is the price elasticity of the demand for drugs at the border of the consumer country.
In this paper, we abstract from modelling the war on drugs inside the consumer country,
and instead assume that the demand function in equation 1 corresponds to the demand
for drugs of a wholesale drug dealer, who buys at the wholesale price at the border of the
consumer country, Pf, and then distributes the illegal drug to cities where they are sold at
retail levels (and prices).
2.2 The drug traﬃcking sub-game
2.2.1 The drug traﬃcking technology
We assume that the drug traﬃcker combines routes, κ, with the illegal drugs bought in the
producer country, Qd, to “produce” illegal drug shipments to the border of the consumer
country, Qf . However, we assume that only a fraction h ∈ [0,1] of the possible routes
are not interdicted by the government.12 Formally, we assume that the drug traﬃcking





where η ∈ (0,1) captures the relative importance of the the illegal drugs bought in
the producer country in the traﬃcking technology, and 1 − η ∈ (0,1) captures the relative
importance of the drug traﬃcking routes. The traﬃcking technology in equation 2 implies
that, at the aggregate level, it does not make a diﬀerence whether there is only one or many
drug traﬃckers, as long as they are all of equal size.13
12The drug traﬃcker might be thought of as being located in the middle of a circle with a given number,
κ, of lines (routes) connecting the middle of the circle with its circumference; the latter might be interpreted
as representing the border of the consumer country. The drug traﬃcker sends drug shipments along these
routes and, ex-post, a fraction, 1 − h, of these routes are discovered by the government authorities.
13If we have N drug traﬃckers, each contesting with the government disjoint sets of κ/N routes, then,
at the aggregate level, their demand for drugs in the producer country and the supply of drugs in the
consumer country would be exactly the same, as in the case where there is only one drug traﬃcker. The
92.2.2 The interdiction technology
The interdiction technology is such that h, the fraction of routes that, ex-post, survive the






where s is the amount of resources that the government invests in interdiction such as
radars, airplanes, go-fast boats, etc.; t is the amount of resources that the drug traﬃcker
invests in trying to avoid the interdiction, for instance, in submarines, go-fast boats, air-
planes, pilots, drug mules, corrupting government oﬃcials to avoid being captured, etc.;
γ>0 is a parameter that captures the relative eﬀectiveness of the resources invested by
the drug traﬃcker in avoiding the government’s interdiction eﬀorts. Note that the fraction




If we assume that all illegal drug shipments are of the same size, then h can also be
thought as the fraction of illegal drugs that survive the government’s interdiction eﬀorts.15
2.2.3 The drug traﬃcker’s problem
We ﬁrst start with the second choice that the drug traﬃcker has to make, namely, the
amount of drugs to buy from the drug producers. The drug traﬃcker takes as given the
government’s choices and drug market prices, both in the producer country, Pd, a n di nt h e
consumer country, Pf. More formally, the drug traﬃcker’s problem is given by:
max
{Qd}
πT = PfQf − PdQd − t. (4)
details of this claim are available from the authors upon request.
14A contest success function (CSF) is “a technology whereby some or all contenders for resources incur
costs in an attempt to weaken or disable competitors” (Hirshleifer, 1991). In this particular case, the CSF
determines the fraction of illegal drugs that is succesfully exported to the consumer country as a function of
the government’s interdiction eﬀorts and the drug traﬃcker’s eﬀorts to avoid the government’s interdiction
of drug shipments. See Skaperdas (1996) and Hirshleifer (2001) for a detailed explanation of the diﬀerent
functional forms of CSF.
15This is, of course, a simplifying assumption that we make for tractability. In reality, diﬀerent illegal
drug shipments have a diﬀerent size that depends, in turn, on the size of the vehicles being used to
transport them (go-fast boat, airplane, drug mule, etc.). However, given our interest in looking at the
aggregate problem of drug traﬃcking, the assumption of equally-sized drug shipments is innocous.
10The ﬁr s tt e r mi ne q u a t i o n4i st h et o t al income derived from drug traﬃcking, where Pf
is the wholesale price of drugs in the consumer country and Qf is the quantity of drugs
successfully exported. The second term is the cost of buying drugs in the producer country,
where Pd is the price of drugs at the farm gate in the producer country. The last term, t, is
the amount of resources invested by the drug traﬃcker in trying to avoid the interdiction
of illegal drug shipments.
Using equations 2 and 3, the demand for illegal drugs from the drug traﬃcker in the












Inserting the optimal demand for drugs in the producer country, Q∗
d, from equation 5
back into the expression for the drug traﬃcker’s proﬁts (equation 4), we get that the drug




















1−η . Replacing h from equation 3 in equation 6, the optimal
amount of resources invested by the drug traﬃcker in trying to escape the interdiction of



















Note that equations 5 and 7 describe the best reaction functions for the drug traﬃcker
with respect to every possible choice of resources by the government in its interdiction
eﬀorts, s.
2.2.4 The government’s problem: interdiction
Recall that at the beginning of the game, the interested outsider grants a subsidy to the
producer country’s government in an attempt to strengthen its resolve in the war against
11illegal drug traﬃcking. This subsidy corresponds to a fraction, 1 − Ω ∈ [0,1), of the
resources that the government allocates to interdiction eﬀorts.
We will assume that the government faces a net cost, c2, p e ru n i to fi n c o m et h a tt h e
drug traﬃcker is able to obtain from traﬃcking illegal drugs.
The government’s problem in the game as a whole is to minimize the costs associated
with illegal drug production, drug traﬃcking and the overall expenses of the two fronts
of the war on drugs. At this stage of the game, however, the government’s objective is
to determine the amount of resources that should be allocated to interdiction eﬀorts in
order to minimize only the sum of the costs associated with illegal drug traﬃcking. The
government takes as given the choices made by the drug traﬃcker, Qd and t,t h ep r i c eo f
drugs at the border of the consumer country, Pf, the net cost to the government of illegal
drug traﬃcking, c2, and the subsidy from the interested outsider, 1 − Ω, and determines
the amount of resources to invest in interdiction eﬀorts, s, so as to minimize the costs
associated with illegal drug traﬃcking. More precisely, the government’s problem at this
stage of the game is:
min
{s}
CT = c2PfQf + Ωs (8)
where Qf is determined by equation 2. Solving the problem in equation 8, the gov-
ernment’s optimal choice of resources allocated to interdiction eﬀorts is determined by the

















Equation 9 denotes the government’s best reaction function to every possible choice
made by the drug traﬃcker with respect to Qd and t.
2.2.5 The drug traﬃcking equilibrium
Using the reaction functions for the drug traﬃcker and the government (equations 5, 7 and


















































Equations 10 and 11 describe the amount of resources that the drug traﬃcker and
the government, respectively, spend on the interdiction sub-game as a function of market
prices and technology parameters. Equation 12 is the fraction of drug routes that are not
interdicted. Recall that h∗ also represents the fraction of illegal drugs successfully exported
to the consumer country in equilibrium. Equation 13 is the demand for drugs of the drug
traﬃcker in the producer country, and equation 14 is the supply of drugs from the drug
traﬃcker at the border of the consumer country.
A few things are worth noting at this stage. First, a higher subsidy from the interested
outsider for the government’s interdiction eﬀorts (that is, a lower Ω) decreases the fraction
of drugs that the drug traﬃcker is able to successfully export to the consumer country.
Additionally, the result regarding the cost faced by the government per unit of income that
the drug traﬃcker is able to obtain from his activity is not surprising - namely, given the
market prices, a higher c2 will induce the government to ﬁght relatively harder against
illegal drug traﬃcking; as a result, the equilibrium fraction of drugs successfully exported
will be lower. Note that the wholesale price of drugs at the border of the consumer country,
Pf, does not aﬀect the fraction of drugs successfully exported. This is because both the
government’s loss and the drug traﬃcker’s proﬁts depend on this price in exactly the same
way (equations 10 and 11). As a result, Pf does not aﬀect h, as the two eﬀects (of t and
s on h) cancel each other out. A higher γ (that is, a higher relative eﬀectiveness of the
resources that the drug traﬃcker allocates to the avoidance of interdiction eﬀorts) increases
the fraction of drugs successfully exported in equilibrium.
132.3 The drug production sub-game
2.3.1 The technology of conﬂict over arable land: The government versus drug
producers
One of the main fronts in the war against drugs is the conﬂict over the control of arable
land suitable for cultivating the crops necessary to produce illegal drugs.16 We assume that
each one of the n drug producers initially controls Li = L/n hectares of land, and that Li
and Lj comprise disjoint sets of land ∀ i,j. L is the total land that can potentially be used
to cultivate illegal crops in the producer country.
We assume that the outcome of the conﬂi c to v e ra r a b l el a n db e t w e e nt h eg o v e r n m e n t
and each drug producer is such that the government controls a fraction gi of the land Li,





where zi and xi denote the resources that the government and drug producer i allocate
to the conﬂict over the control over arable land, respectively. φ>0 captures the relative
eﬃciency of the resources that drug producer i allocates to the conﬂict with the government
over the control of arable land. Note that the fraction of land controlled by the government




2.3.2 The technology of conﬂict over arable land: drug producers versus drug
producers
After the conﬂict over land between the government and drug producers, the latter also
engage in a dispute with each other over the control of land that the government does not
control.17 This land consists of
n X
i=1
(1 − gi)Li hectares. We denote the fraction of land not
16For instance, cocaine is produced from the alkaloid extracted from the leaves of coca plants, whereas
heroin is produced from oppium poppy seeds.
17This is an assumption that matches the Colombian experience quite well. There are numerous examples
in Colombia of military confrontations between illegal drug producers for the control of land not controlle
by the government. For instance, in the Catatumbo and Sierra Nevada regions, the FARC and the AUC
(the two main illegal drug producers) had military confrontations in 2004 for the control of more than
30.000 hectares of land planted with coca bushes (see Revista Cambio, “Tiempo de muerte y de cosecha,”
8/8/2004, and El Tiempo, 18/01/2005).











(1 − gk). (16)
In the conﬂict between drug producers for the land that the government does not control,
we assume that drug producer i ends up controlling, on average, a fraction fi, where fi is







where yi and yk denote the resources allocated by the i − th and the k − th drug pro-
ducers respectively, to this conﬂict. The contest success function in equation 17 implicitly
assumes that each drug producer is equally eﬃcient in this conﬂict.
2.3.3 The drug production technology
We assume that illegal drugs are produced by combining two factors - arable land, l, nec-
essary for cultivating the illegal crop; and other material resources (workshops, chemicals,
microwaves, labor, etc.), r. These two factors are combined according to the following





i , where 0 <α<1, (18)
where Qd,i is the amount of drugs produced by the drug producer i , λ>0 is a produc-
tivity parameter, ri is the amount of resources complementary to land such as chemicals,
workshops, etc., and li i st h ea m o u n to fl a n dt h a tt h ei − th drug producer controls. The
latter, in turn, is determined by:
li = qfiL, (19)
where q and fi are determined by equations 16 and 17, respectively.
2.3.4 The drug producers’ problem
We assume that there is a competitive market for illicit drugs in the producer country,
w h e r ee a c ho n eo ft h ep r o d u c e r st a k e st h ep r i c eo fd r u g si nt h ep r o d u c e rc o u n t r y ,Pd, as
15given. The i − th drug producer ﬁr s tc h o o s e st h ea m o u n to fr e s o u r c e st h a tt oa l l o c a t et o
the conﬂict with the government over the control of arable land, xi; he then has to choose
the amount of resources to allocate to the conﬂict with the other drug producers over the
control of the arable land that the government does not control, yi;ﬁnally, once he knows
how much land he controls, he has to choose how much to invest in those factors that are
complementary to land in the production of illegal drugs, ri.
We start with the last stage of the drug production sub-game, where the drug producer
already knows how much land he controls and has to choose ri. The drug producer’s problem
at this stage is given by:
max
{ri}
π(xi,y i,r i)=PdQd,i − (xi + yi + ri). (20)
The optimal choice of ri,g i v e nt h ea m o u n to fl a n dt h a th ec o n t r o l s ,i sd e t e r m i n e db y














1−αqfiL − (xi + yi), (22)





In step 3 of the game, illegal drug producer i has to choose the optimal allocation of
resources to the conﬂict he is engaged in with other producers over the control of arable
land that the government does not control, yi, in order to maximize proﬁts (equation 22).

















Equation 23 describes the best reaction function for drug producer i to every possible
choice of resources by other drug producers, yj ∀j 6= i, in the conﬂict over the control of
land that the government does not control.
16Inasmuch as we have assumed that all drug producers are equally eﬀective in the conﬂict
over arable land that the government does not control, the optimal choice of yi will be the
same for all drug producers (that is y∗







Plugging the optimal choice of yi from equation 23 into equation 22, the proﬁts of drug







n2 − xi. (25)
In the conﬂict over the control of arable land with the government, each drug producer
chooses xi to maximize proﬁts at this stage (equation 25). The optimal choice of resources
allocated by drug producer i to this conﬂict with the government, xi, is determined by the















Equation 26 is the best reaction function for drug producer i in the conﬂict over arable
land with the government to all possible allocations by the latter in this conﬂict.
2.3.5 The government’s problem: the conﬂict over the control of arable land
In the conﬂict with drug producers over the control of arable land, the government chooses
the amount of resources to allocate to this conﬂict, zi, in order to minimize the sum of
the costs associated with illegal drug production and the costs of ﬁghting against the n
drug producers over the control of arable land. The government takes as given the drug
producers’ choices of ri, xi and yi, the price of illegal drugs in the producer country, Pd,
the cost associated with each unit of resources that drug producers are able to obtain
from illegal drug production, c1, and the subsidy from the interested outsider towards the
government’s expenses on this front of the war on drugs, 1−ω. The government’s problem















1−αqL i st h ed r u gp r o d u c e r s ’i n c o m ea tt h i ss t a g eo ft h eg a m e . T h e














Equation 28 is the government’s best reaction function in the conﬂict over the control
of arable land with each illegal drug producer.
2.3.6 The drug production equilibrium
The Nash equilibrium of the drug production sub-game is given by the intersection of the
reaction functions of the drug producers (equation 26) and the government (equation 28),
and the equilibrium outcome of the conﬂict between drug producers for the control of land
that the government does not control. On the one hand, the conﬂict between producers is
characterized by an equilibrium outcome whereby each drug producer ends up controlling
an equal fraction, 1/n, of the land that the government does not control. This is because
we have assumed that all drug producers are equally eﬃcient in this conﬂict. On the other
hand, the equilibrium allocation of resources to the conﬂict over arable land between the
government and drug producers is obtained using equations 26 and 28, and is characterized


















φω2(1 − α)2 . (30)





c1n2 + φω(1 − α)
. (31)
According to equation 31, the fraction of land that the government does not control is an
increasing function of the drug producers’ relative eﬃciency in the conﬂict for land, φ;t h e
relative importance of land in the production of illegal drugs, 1 − α; a decreasing function
18of the subsidy from the interest outsider to the drug producer country’s government in the
conﬂict over land, 1 − ω; the cost to the government from illegal drug production, c1; and
the number of illegal drug producers, n.
Substituting equation 31 into equations 24 and 21, we obtain the equilibrium values for
the drug producers’ allocation of resources to the conﬂict over arable land with other drug


















Finally, replacing the value of ri from equation 33 and fi =1 /n into equation 18 (and
adding over the n drug producers), we get an equation that describes the total supply of















where, again, q∗ is determined by equation 31.
2.4 The drug market equilibrium
In this section of the paper we close the model by deriving the drug market equilibrium
conditions. These market equilibrium conditions, together with the Nash equilibrium de-
rived above for each one of the two sub-games, characterize the equilibrium of the model
as a whole.
From the drug production sub-game, we get the supply of drugs in the producer country
as a function of the price of drugs in the producer country, Qs
d(Pd) (equation 34). From
the drug traﬃcking sub-game, we get the demand for drugs in the producer country (from
the drug traﬃcker) as a function of the price of drugs in both the producer country and
the consumer country, Qd
d(Pd,P f) (equation 13). Equating the supply and the demand for




















From the drug traﬃcking sub-game, we get the supply of illegal drugs in the consumer
country as a function of the price of drugs in both the producer country and the consumer
country, Qs
f(Pd,P f). Equating the supply of drugs in equation 14 with the demand for
drugs in the consumer country (equation 1), we get the drug market equilibrium condition




















The analytic solution to these two equations, and the corresponding quantities of drugs
transacted in equilibrium in both producer and consumer countries, are presented in the
appendix.
2.5 The interested outsider’s problem
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, the interested outsider determines the optimal allocation
of subsidies to the two fronts of the war on drugs - namely, the conﬂict over the control
of arable land and the interdiction front. The total cost to the interested outsider, Mo, is
given by:
Mo = n(1 − ω)z
∗ + Ωs
∗. (37)
Replacing the equilibrium values of z∗ and s∗ (from equations 30 and 11, respectively)
as well as the equilibrium values for P∗
d,P ∗
f, and Q∗
f , derived in the appendix, the total
cost to the interested outsider can be expressed as a function of q, h, and the parameters
of the model. After some algebraic manipulation, the total cost to the interested outsider
c a nb ew r i t t e na s :

















20where: Γ,ψ ,Υ,Θ,A ,and B are themselves functions of the parameters of the model
(presented in the appendix).
Additionally, the quantity of drugs successfully produced and exported in equilibrium






where, again, ζ, χ, and C are combinations of the structural parameters of the model
(presented in the appendix).
The interested outsider’s problem in the ﬁr s ts t a g eo ft h eg a m ei st oc h o o s et h eo p t i m a l
allocation of subsidies to the two fronts of the war on drugs in order to minimize the supply
of drugs reaching the consumer country subject to a budget constraint. More precisely, the






subject to Mo ≤ M.
where Q∗
f is given by equation 39, Mo by equation 38, and M is the total budget for
subsidies aimed at strengthening the government’s resolve in its war against illegal drug
production and traﬃcking.
Choosing ω ∈ [0,1] and Ω ∈ [0,1] is equivalent to choosing q ∈ [0,
φ(1 − α)




c2 + γ(1 − η)







subject to : Mo ≤ M, (42)
0 <q<
φ(1 − α)




c2 + γ(1 − η)
. (44)
18Note that q(w) is a continuous biyection from [0,1] to [0,
φ(1−α)
c1n2+φ(1−α)]; likewise, h(Ω) is a continuous
biyection from [0,1] to [0,
γ(1−η)
c2+γ(1−η)].




























where, Λ is the marginal cost of reducing Q∗
f b yo n eu n i tw h e nt h es u b s i d i e st ot h et w o
fronts of the war on drug production and traﬃcking are allocated eﬃciently.19










is the marginal cost of reducing
the production and traﬃcking of illegal drugs by one unit by marginally increasing 1 − ω
(decreasing ω), which is the subsidy that the interested outsider grants to the government
in its war against drug producers for the control of arable land.










is the marginal cost of reducing
the production and traﬃcking of illegal drugs by one unit by marginally increasing 1 − Ω
(decreasing Ω), which is the subsidy that the interested outsider grants to the government
in its eﬀorts to interdict illegal drug shipments.
Using expressions 39 and 38 we can explicitly calculate each one of these terms. On
the one hand, the marginal cost of reducing the quantity of drugs that reach the consumer



































On the other hand, the marginal cost of reducing the quantity of drugs that reach the



































191/Λ is the Lagange multiplier associated with the restriction Mo ≤ M of the problem in equation 41.
223 Calibration strategy
To calibrate the parameters of the model we use data from the market for cocaine as
well as available data on the well documented Plan Colombia (henceforth PC). Under this
Plan the U.S. government has provided about $600 million per year since 2000 to the
Colombian government for its ﬁght against illegal drug production and traﬃcking. Most of
these subsidies have taken the form of military equipment (helicopters, planes, chemicals
to spray the illegal crops, radars, etc.) and training. We take some observed outcomes
of the cocaine markets from the United Nations Oﬃce for Drug Control (UNODC) such
as the number of hectares cultivated with coca crops, the price of cocaine at the farm
gate in Colombia and the wholesale price of cocaine in consumer countries, data on drug
seizures before and after PC, and available estimates on productivity per hectare. We also
use data from the Colombian Government and the U.S. Government Accountability Oﬃce
(GAO) for estimates of U.S. and Colombian military expenditures under PC. We will take
an average of the outcomes observed between 1998, 1999 and 2000 as the reference point
before PC and the average for 2004, 2005 and 2006 as the reference point after PC.20
We will denote all variables before PC (that is, all average for years 1998, 1999 and
2000) with a subscript B. In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, all variables
after PC (averages for years 2004, 2005 and 2006) will not have a subscript. In the
remaining of this section we describe the main equations from the model that we will use
to recover the parameters of the model. As it will become clear, the calibration strategy
follows recursively.
3.1 A brief description of the data
Using satellite images, UNODC estimates that the average number of hectares cultivated
with coca crops, q∗L, before PC was about 161,700 and, after PC, this number had de-
creased to about 81,300 hectares. Using an estimated value for L ' 500,000, which is
the number of hectares that can potentially be used to cultivate coca (from Grossman and
Mejía, 2008) and the ﬁgures for coca cultivation just described, the percentage of land un-
der the eﬀective control of the drug producers, q∗, was about 32.3% before PC and 16.2%
20Although there is available data for 2007, UNODC usually makes revisions to their estimates of the
illegal drug markets for the previous year and therefore it is more convinient to use data that has already
been thoroughly revised.
23after PC.
The ﬁgures on productivity per hectare are estimated by UNODC using ﬁeld studies in a
sample of workshops in the cocaine producing regions.21 Although there is a large variance
in productivity per hectare across diﬀerent regions in Colombia, on average, one hectare of
land cultivated with coca crops before PC produced about 4.3 kg of pure cocaine. After
PC this number was estimated at about 7.75 kg per hectare per year. Potential cocaine
production in Colombia was about 688,800 kg before PC and about 630,000 kg after PC.22
Using the estimates of drug seizures in Colombia calculated by UNODC as well as the data
on potential cocaine production, we can recover the fraction of drugs that are note seized
in Colombia. Reported seizures of pure cocaine were about 77.5 metric tons before PC and
about 166 metric tons after PC.23 This implies that before PC the fraction of cocaine not
seized, h∗, was about 88.7% whereas after PC it was about 73.6%. Once one takes into
account drug seizures of Colombian cocaine outside of Colombia, the Colombian supply of
cocaine, net of total interdiction, was about 570,000 kg before PC and about 400,000 kg
after PC. When estimating some of the parameters of the model we need to control for
the fact that Colombia is not the sole supplier of cocaine in the world. In fact, potential
cocaine production in the world, that is adding to Colombian production that of Bolivia
and Peru, was about 876,000 kg and 991,000 kg before and after PC respectively. In other
words, while Colombian potential cocaine production decreased between 2000 and 2006,
the production of Bolivia and Peru together increased. Before PC the share of total cocaine
supplied by Colombia was about 78%, whereas after PC this share had decreased to about
63%.
According to UNODC, the average price of a kilogram of cocaine at the wholesale level
in consumer countries, P∗
f, was about $39,800 before PC and, after PC, about $33,800.24
21See UNODC’s crop monitoring reports for diﬀerent years.
22UNODC estimates potential cocaine production multiplying the estimates for productivity per hectare
per year (kilograms of cocaine obtained from one hectare of land cultivated with coca crops in one year)
obtained from samples of ﬁled work in workshops in producer countries, and the estimated number of
hetares of land cultivated with coca crops. For a thorough description of these estimates see UNODC crop
monitoring reports for Colombia for diﬀerent years. These methodologies as well as possible biases are also
discussed in some detail in Mejia and Posada (2008).
23These are estimates for seizures of pure cocaine inside Colombia.
24For these price ﬁgures at the wholesale level in consumer country we take a weighted average of reported
prices in Europe and the US, with the weights before PC being 28% for Europe and 72% for the US. The
weights we use after PC are 36% and 64% respectively. We approximate these weights using the share
24In Colombia, the price of a kilogram of cocaine at the farm gate, P∗
d, was approximately
$1,500 before PC and $1,780 after PC.
According to Colombia’s National Planning Department (DNP, 2006), the total military
component of Colombian expenses in the war on drugs under PC has been about $570
million per year since 2000.25 Although we don’t have direct estimates for every year,
we take this average as the baseline for the expenses in the war on drugs after PC. We
don’t have an oﬃcial estimate for the level of Colombian expenses in the war against drug
production and traﬃcking before PC. However, we do have estimates for military and
defense expenditures as a share of GDP. Before PC this share was about 3.25% and, after
PC, this share had increased to about 4.3%. That is, between 1998-2000 and 2004-2006
total military and defense expenditures as a share of GDP increased by about 32%. We also
have an estimate for the number of members of the military forces per 1,000 inhabitants in
Colombia. Before PC this number was about 3.5 and after PC it had increased to about
4.7, that is, a 37% increase between 1999-2000 and 2005-2006. Based on these two proxies
we make the assumption that Colombian expenses in the war on drugs increased by about
35% between 1998-2000 and 2004-2006. Combining this assumption and the ﬁgure for
Colombian expenses in the war on drugs after PC, we arrive at an estimate for Colombian
expenses in the war on drugs before PC of about $420 million. The United States, on the
other hand, has spent about $465 million per year in subsidies to the military forces of
Colombia in order to strengthen their resolve in the war against illegal drug production
and traﬃcking (see DNP, 2006).
Finally, we take n =2 , to be the number of illegal drug producers after PC. There is wide
agreement among Colombian and foreign observers26 that Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias
of total cocaine consumers in Europe and the US before and after PC respectively from UNODC (see
UNODC, World Drug Report 2000-2008).
25The other two broad components on Plan Colombia (in addition to the military component) are
institutional strenghthening and social programs.
26Rabasa and Chalk (2001), Echeverry (2004), Thoumi (2003), and UNODC (2003). Bottía (2003) and
Diaz and Sanchez (2004) use data from municipalities to conﬁrm the high correlation between cocaine
production and the control of arable land by the FARC and the AUC. Rangel (2000) tells us that at
one time the FARC only taxed and provided security for those stages related to drug production and
exportation – the cultivation of coca, the manufacturing of cocaine from coca base, and the traﬃcking of
cocaine – but that subsequently, the FARC began, as it does now, to organize and direct the production
and exportation of cocaine.
In a recent interview Salvatore Mancuso, once the head of the AUC and now serving prision in the US
25de Colombia (FARC) and the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC), notwithstanding
their historical origins as left-wing guerrillas and right-wing paramilitaries respectively,
act as the new drug producers and are the residual claimants of the proﬁts from cocaine
production and from cocaine traﬃcking (at least in the initial stages of the traﬃcking
network).
Table 1 summarizes the main stylized facts described above about the cocaine market
and the war on drugs in Colombia before and after PC that will be used in the baseline
calibration exercise.
[Insert Table 1 here: Data used in the baseline calibration exercise].
3.2 Results and discussion
We now consider the calibration of the model. As the reader shall see, the calibration
follows recursively. That is, using the observed data described in the previous section, we
start with the equations of the model where we can estimate parameters with the infor-
mation that we have and then turn to other equations of the model in order to estimate
the remainder parameters. We ﬁrst calibrate the model without the assumption that the
interested outsider (i.e., the U.S. government) chooses an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies
b e t w e e nt h et w of r o n t so ft h ew a ro nd r u g s .I no t h e rw o r d s ,w ea l l o wt h ea v a i l a b l ei n f o r -
mation to determine whether the subsidies granted by the U.S. government for the war on
drugs in Colombia have been assigned eﬃciently; if not, we estimate the eﬃciency cost of
this misallocation. As discussed in the previous section, the condition for an eﬃcient allo-
cation of subsidies is that the marginal cost (again, to the U.S.) of decreasing the successful
production and exportation of drugs by one kilogram through subsidizing the Colombian
military’s eﬀorts against illegal drug production (equation 47) should be equal to the mar-
ginal cost (to the U.S.) of decreasing the successful production and exportation of drugs
for drug traﬃcking, admits that the AUC and the FARC now control the business of cocaine production
(and part of the traﬃcking) in Colombia. He also explicily states, while mentioning some facts, that the
split of production between the two groups is about equal (see Revista Semana, ‘Las Cuentas de Mancuso,’
available at: http://www.semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=115092).
26by one kilogram through subsidizing the Colombian military’s eﬀorts against illegal drug
traﬃcking (equation 48).




d = Qf (49)












⇒ η ' 0.08 . (51)
This estimate of the parameter η implies that the relative importance of cocaine in
the traﬃc k i n gt e c h n o l o g yi sa b o u t8 % ,w h e r e a st h er e l a t i v ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h er o u t ef o r
transporting the illegal drugs is about 92%.
Rearranging the equation for the equilibrium fraction of drugs that survives the gov-
ernment’s interdiction eﬀorts (equation 12), we get:
hB











before and after PC respectively. Recall that before PC, Ω =1(that is, before PC
there were no subsidies for Colombia for its war on drugs). Using the two expressions in





⇒ Ω ' 0.35. (53)
The estimate of the subsidy from the U.S. government to the Colombian government
implies that the former paid for about 65% (1 − Ω) of the expenses for the interdiction
eﬀorts of the latter.
27In order to keep the notation as simple as possible, we abstract from including and * to the endogenous
variables in equilibrium. Of course, all endogenous variables observed in the data (prices, quantities, h, q,
etc.) are equilibrium values.
27Using the estimate for η from equation 51, together with the expression for the traﬃcking












⇒ κ ' 519,750 . (54)










before and after PC respectively.
Combining the two expressions in equation 55, and using the amount of cocaine that









Solving the previous expression for b, and using the available data on the quantities and











¶ ⇒ b ' 0.62. (57)
It should be noted that the price elasticity of demand for cocaine that we are calibrating
i sn o tt h a tf o rﬁnal consumers, but rather that for drug dealers at the wholesale level in
t h ec o n s u m e rc o u n t r y .A sB e c k e re ta l .( 2 0 0 6 )s h o wa n da sw ew i l ld i s c u s sb e l o w ,t h ep r i c e
elasticity of demand is a crucial parameter behind the eﬀectiveness of the war on drugs.
A relatively inelastic demand for cocaine implies that a large increase in the resources
allocated to the war on illegal drug production and traﬃcking will only decrease the amount
of drugs transacted by a relatively small amount. Our estimate for this parameter denotes
an inelastic demand for cocaine at the wholesale level.
28The amount of cocaine reaching the U.S. borders is estimated using the amount of cocaine ﬂowing
towards the U.S.from producing countries minus the amount interdicted in transit countries. Both of these
estimates are taken from GAO, 2008.
28Using the estimated value for b and equation 1 we estimate the scale parameter of the
demand function, a, as:
a = QfPb
f. ⇒ a ' 262,325,000. (58)
In order to recover the parameters of the drug production technology, we use available
data for the productivity per hectare of land used in the cultivation of coca crops - that is,
the number of kilograms of cocaine produced on one hectare of land in one year. According
to UNODC, the productivity per hectare in Colombia increased from about 4.26 kg per
hectare per year before PC to about 7.75 kg per hectare per year after PC. This large
increase in productivity has been attributed to better planting techniques and to the use
of more productive intermediate inputs. Using equation 34, the productivities per hectare










































¶ ⇒ α ' 0.79 . (60)
The estimated value of α implies that the relative importance of land in the production
of cocaine is about 21%, whereas that of other inputs (chemicals, workshops, the “cook,”
etc.) is about 79%.
Having found an estimate for α, the scale parameter of the cocaine production tech-
nology can be obtained from the expression for the productivity per hectare per year (the




(αPd)α ⇒ λ ' 0.005 . (61)
We now turn to the calibration of the costs faced by the Colombian government per
unit of income obtained by illegal drug producers and traﬃckers, c1 and c2 respectively.










ω(1 − α)(1 − q)
qn2 . (62)
In order to calibrate c1and c2, as well as other parameters, we use the equation describing
the government’s total expenses for the war on drugs before and after PC (equations 64
and 65 below).
The Colombian budget for the war against drugs after PC is the sum of the costs for





Replacing the values for z∗ and s∗ in equation 63 and simplifying, we get:
Ms =( 1− q
∗)PdQdc1 +( 1− h
∗)PfQfc2. (64)
The expression in equation 64 corresponds to total Colombian expenses on the war on
drugs after PC. The corresponding expression for before PC is given by:
MsB =( 1− q
∗
B)PdBQdBc1 +( 1− h
∗
B)PfBQfBc2. (65)
We have values for all the variables in equations 64 and 65 except c1and c2.S o l v i n gf o r
these two unknowns in equations 64 and 65, we get:
c1 =
MsB(1 − h∗)PfQf − (1 − h∗
B)PfBQfBMs
(1 − q∗
B)PdBQdB(1 − h∗)PfQf − (1 − h∗
B)PfBQfB(1 − q∗)PdQd




MsB(1 − q∗)PdQd − (1 − q∗
B)PdBQdBMs
(1 − q∗
B)PdBQdB(1 − h∗)PfQf − (1 − h∗
B)PfBQfB(1 − q∗)PdQd
⇒ c2 ' 0.06 .
(67)
These estimates imply that, with the price in Colombia of one kilogram of cocaine at
$1,777, the Colombian government perceives a cost of about $693 per kilogram of cocaine
successfully produced (0.39 × $1,777). With potential cocaine production after PC at
30about 630,000 kg, the cost to the Colombian government arising from cocaine production
has been roughly $437 million per year. This cost does not include yet the costs of ﬁghting
the war against drugs, which will be estimated and discussed below. Turning to the other
front of the war on drugs (the interdiction front), we ﬁnd that, with the price per kilogram
of cocaine at the wholesale level in consumer countries at about $33,800, the Colombian
government faces a cost of about $1,900 per kilogram of cocaine that is successfully exported
(0.06 × $33,800). If about 398,800 kg of cocaine per year were successfully exported after
PC, the cost to the Colombian government arising from illegal drug traﬃcking has been
about $763 million per year. This cost does not include yet the cost of ﬁghting the war
against illegal drug traﬃcking, which, again, will be estimated and discussed below.
The total subsidies from the interested outsider (the U.S. government) to the producer
country, Mo, equals the sum of the subsidies allocated to the war against production and
those allocated to the war against drug traﬃcking. That is:
Mo =( 1− q)
1 − ω
ω




We now use equation 68 to estimate the subsidy from the interested outsider to the drug
producer country’s government in its war against drug producers, 1 − ω. Solving equation
68 for ω, and using the data on prices, quantities, and the parameters estimated so far
yields:
ω =
Mo − (1 − h∗)1−Ω
Ω QfPfc2
(1 − q∗)QdPdc1 + Mo − (1 − h∗)1−Ω
Ω QfPfc2
⇒ ω ' 0.79 . (69)
The calibrated value of ω implies that, after PC, the U.S. government has funded about
half (21%) of Colombia’s expenses in its conﬂict over land with illegal drug producers.
Having estimated ω, c1, and c2, we can now use the two expressions in equation 62
to calibrate the relative eﬃciency of the resources allocated by drug producers in their
conﬂict with the government for the control of arable land, φ, and the relative eﬃciency
of the resources that the drug traﬃcker allocates in order to avoid the interdiction of drug
shipments, γ. Solving for γ in the ﬁrst expression of equation 62, and using the estimations




⇒ γ ' 0.48 . (70)
31Solving for φ in the second expression of equation 62 and, again, using the estimations
obtained so far, we get:
φ =
q∗c1n2
ω(1 − α)(1 − q∗)
⇒ φ ' 1.82 . (71)
On the one hand, the estimated value for γ implies that the resources that the drug
traﬃcker allocates to evade the interdiction of drug shipments are less eﬃcient than the
resources allocated by the Colombian government to the interdiction front of the war on
drugs. On the other hand, the value of φ resulting from the calibration of the model implies
that the resources allocated by drug producers to the conﬂict over arable land are much
more eﬃcient than those allocated by the Colombian government to this conﬂict. In sum,
the results imply that the government is 2 times more eﬃcient (1/0.49) in interdicting
drug shipments than the drug traﬃcker is in escaping the interdiction, whereas the drug
producers are about 1.8 times more eﬃcient than the government in the conﬂict over the
control of arable land.29
Table 2 summarizes the main results from the calibration of the model in our baseline
exercise.
[Insert Table 2 here: Calibration results for the baseline exercise].
3.3 Other variables of interest
Having estimated all the parameters of the model, we can now recover other important
variables of the model. Among others, the equilibrium level of expenses for each of the
actors involved in the war on drugs, the proﬁts and proﬁt margins for drug producers and
the drug traﬃcker, the intensity of conﬂict, and the total cost of ﬁghting the war on drugs
in Colombia.
First, we estimate the level of expenses for each actor involved in the war on drugs.
These estimates are:
29Although the Colombian army has access to better technologies and equipment, the fact that the illegal
armed groups associated with illegal drug production are able to use guerrilla tactics in its war against the








According to our estimates, after PC, each illegal drug producer spends about $24.5
million per year ﬁghting the Colombian government for the control of arable land, and
about $58.7 million ﬁghting against other illegal drug producers. Furthermore, each drug
producer spends about $442 million on those factors that are complementary to land in
the production of cocaine (chemicals, workshops, “cooks”, raspachines,30 etc.). Colombia
and the U.S., on the other hand, spend about $462 million per year in the conﬂict over
the control of arable land against the two illegal drug producers, out of which Colombia
pays for about $366 million and the U.S. for about $96 million . The drug traﬃcker spends
about $3.26 billion per year trying to avoid the interdiction of cocaine shipments (go-fast
boats, submarines, small airplanes, drug mules, corrupting the authorities, etc.). This is not
surprising, given the huge proﬁt margins associated with illegal drug traﬃcking activities.
Colombia and the U.S. together spend about $569 million trying to interdict illegal drug
shipments, out of which Colombia pays for about $201 million and the U.S. for about $368
million.
Using the information above, we can estimate the sum of the resources allocated to
the war on drugs by all actors involved (the government, the interested outsider, drug
producers, and the drug traﬃcker). This sum, here denoted by IC, can be interpreted as a
measure of the intensity of the war on drugs. This measure does not include investments in
r (the complementary factors to land in the production of cocaine) by the drug producers,
as this variable does not capture investments in the conﬂict, but rather an investment in a
factor of production of cocaine. IC is given by:
IC = t + s +
X
i
(xi + yi + zi) ' 4.5 billion. (72)
30This is the name in Spanish for those workers in charge of cultivating and harvesting illegal crops.
33Having estimated the level of expenses for each front of the war on drugs in Colombia,
we can now obtain an estimate for the proﬁts from illegal drug production (for each drug
producer) and from cocaine traﬃcking. The proﬁts for each individual drug producer are
given by:
πi ' $34 million per year. (73)
This ﬁgure denotes the proﬁts obtained by each illegal drug producer per year. Accord-
ing to a press release from the Oﬃce of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP), FARC
drug proﬁts in 2005 ranged between $60 and $115 million.31 Our estimate for FARC drug
proﬁts of $34 million for 2004-2006, which includes only those proﬁts from cocaine produc-
tion and not those from drug traﬃcking, is not too far from that obtained by other sources,
especially if one takes into account that the FARC are also involved in the very initial stages
of cocaine traﬃcking inside Colombia. The same press release also mentions that FARC
drug proﬁts per kilogram of cocaine produced are between $195 and $320. Our estimate
for FARC drug proﬁts per kilogram of cocaine successfully produced is $110. Again, this
ﬁgure does not include FARC proﬁts from cocaine traﬃcking.
The average rate of return from illegal drug production, calculated as the ratio of total
proﬁts to total costs from illegal drug production, is estimated to be roughly 6.5%.
Using equations 87, 86, and 12 to express the drug traﬃcker’s proﬁts (equation 4) as a
function of the parameters of the model, we can use the parameter values estimated so far
in order to ﬁnd an estimate for this variable:
πT ' $9.1 billion per year. (74)
This estimate denotes the total proﬁts from cocaine traﬃcking. To simplify the analysis
in our model, we made the assumption of a single drug traﬃcker, though in fact, there are
probably many groups engaged in cocaine traﬃcking that share these proﬁts. Furthermore,
drug traﬃcking activities require vertically integrated networks that operate not only in
Colombia, but also along the routes towards drug consumer countries in North America
31See http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/pda/060407.html.
34and Europe. The average rate of return from illegal drug traﬃcking, calculated as the ratio
between total proﬁts to total costs from illegal drug traﬃcking, is roughly 207%.
The total costs to the Colombian government arising from illegal drug traﬃcking and
production are, respectively:
CT ' $964 million per year, (75)
and,
CP ' $802 million per year. (76)
According to our results, the total cost to Colombia from illegal drug production, traf-
ﬁcking, and the war against these activities, is about $1.8 billion per year (about 1.6% of
Colombia’s GDP).
We now estimate the marginal cost to the interested outsider (i.e. the U.S.) of reducing
the amount of cocaine reaching the consumer country by one kilogram. Using equations
47 and 48, we estimate the marginal cost to the U.S. government of reducing the supply of
cocaine reaching consumer countries by one kilogram by subsidizing the war against drug
producers (i.e. by reducing ω) and by subsidizing the war against drug traﬃcking (i.e. by
reducing Ω). The estimates for these two marginal costs are:
MCU.S.
ω ' $86,300 and MCU.S.
Ω =$ 9 ,800 . (77)
The corresponding marginal costs to Colombia of reducing the quantity of cocaine
successfully exported to consumer countries by one kilogram if the U.S. marginally changes
ω or Ω a r et h u sg i v e nb y :
MCCOL
ω ' $1 1 ,500 and MCCOL
Ω =$ 2 ,480 . (78)
The total marginal cost of reducing the amount of cocaine reaching consumer countries
by one kilogram by reducing ω and Ω is given by the sum of the respective marginal costs
to the U.S. and Colombia.
The ﬁrst column of Table 3 summarizes the results for the variables of interest obtained
for the baseline calibration exercise under the current (ineﬃcient) allocation of subsidies
by the U.S. to the war on drugs in Colombia.
35[Insert Table 3 here: Calibration results for diﬀerent allocations of subsidies]
Given the diﬀerence in the estimated marginal costs and the fact that the calibrated
values for 1−ω and 1−Ω are strictly positive, we can infer that the allocation of subsidies
to the two fronts of the war on drugs under PC has not been eﬃcient.32
A few questions naturally follow from this last result. What would be the subsidies to
the two fronts of the war on drugs under an eﬃcient allocation? What is the eﬃciency loss
due to the misallocation of subsidies? Finally, what would be the equilibrium level of the
endogenous variables of the model if the subsidies were allocated eﬃciently? Recall that
based on the calibration of the model presented above, we found that 1 − ω ' 0.21 and
1−Ω ' 0.65. Using the optimality condition for the interest outsider’s problem (equations
46, 47, and 48) as well as its budget constraint (equation 68) we calibrate the eﬃcient
allocation of subsidies to the two fronts of the war on drugs in Colombia. We ﬁnd that
the solution would be a corner solution. More speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that under an eﬃcient
allocation of subsidies, the U.S. government would allocate all its resources to subsidizing
the Colombian government’s interdiction eﬀorts. Under an eﬃcient allocation, the U.S.
government would not subsidize the Colombian government in its conﬂict with the drug
producers over the control of arable land (1 − ω∗ ' 0), and it would, however, subsidize
about 68% of the resources spent by the Colombian government on the interdiction of
illegal drug shipments (under the current allocation the U.S. subsidizes 65% of Colombian
expenses on this front of the war on drugs). Under an eﬃcient allocation, then, we would
have the following:
1 − ω∗ ' 0 and 1 − Ω∗ ' 0.68. (79)
With these optimal subsidies, we can now estimate the marginal cost of decreasing the
supply of drugs in consumer countries. These marginal costs are now given by:33
MCU.S.
ω∗ ' $68,380 and MCU.S.
Ω∗ =$ 1 1 ,200 (80)
32Note that the two marginal costs could in principle be diﬀerent, even if the interested outsider is
allocates subsidies eﬃciently. However, this would be the case only if the solution to the interested outsider’s
problem is a corner solution (that is, with either 1 − ω =0 , or 1 − Ω =0 ). However, the calibrated values
for both ω and Ω are strictly less than 1 (ω =0 .79 and Ω =0 .35).
33Note that these two marginal costs are not equal because the solution to the optimization problem for
the interested outsider is in a corner. The relevant marginal cost is the lowest one, that is MCUS
Ω∗ .
36The respective ﬁgures for Colombia would then be:
MCCOL
ω∗ ' $1 4 ,250 and MCCOL
Ω∗ =$ 2 ,500 . (81)
Another question naturally arising from the ﬁnding that subsidies have not been allo-
cated eﬃciently is, by how much would the supply of cocaine have been decreased if the
U . S .h a di nf a c ta l l o c a t e dt h es u b s i d i e st ot h ew a ro nd r u g se ﬃciently? We can estimate
the supply of drugs using all of the parameters of the model calibrated above but, instead
of using the estimated values for ω and Ω, we use the subsidies under an eﬃcient allocation
- 1 − ω∗ =0and 1 − Ω∗ =0 .68. Had the subsidies been allocated eﬃciently, we ﬁnd that
the cocaine supply in consumer countries would have been 2% lower than it actually was.
That is, instead of being about 398,800 kg, it would have been about 390,600 kg. In other
words, although the subsidies were not allocated eﬃciently, the eﬃciency loss due to the
ineﬃcient allocation was relatively low. However, under the eﬃcient allocation of subsidies,
reducing by 8,200 kg (2%) the amount of cocaine reaching consumer countries would cost
about $90 million to the U.S. and about $20 million to Colombia.
The second column of Table 3 presents the results of the calibration of the model in the
baseline exercise under an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies.
3.4 Robustness checks
In the previous section, we used the ﬁgures produced by the UNODC, the main data
source for data on, among other things, illegal drug production, illegal crop cultivation,
interdiction, and market outcomes, and data from the U.S. and the Colombian governments
in order to calibrate the parameters of the model. However, there are alternative sources of
information for some of the data that we used in the baseline calibration exercise presented
above. For instance, the White House Oﬃce for National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP)
also collects data on coca cultivation and interdiction of illegal drugs.34 We also have
34Many informed observers agree that ONDCP data is not as reliable (see, for instance, Dobbs, 2007,
and Mejia and Posada, 2008). For instance, the ONDCP also produces an estimate of potential cocaine
production. There are many problems with this estimation however. For one thing, the ONDCP never
says how it calculated these ﬁgures; furthermore, the ﬁgures themselves are very erratic, and the reported
ﬁgures for a given year are changed frequently in oﬃcial statements and press releases. As a result, we
only use ONDCP ﬁgures for coca cultivation, while continuing to use the productivity measures from the
original data source, the UNODC, in arriving at estimates of potential cocaine production.
37data on cocaine prices from a diﬀerent data source, STRIDE. Although STRIDE price
data mostly captures retail transactions in the U.S., it also produces a price series for
transactions of cocaine greater than 50 grams (with a median of about 118 grams per
transaction). This is the closest alternative ﬁgure we might use for the wholesale price of
cocaine in the U.S. in order to check the robustness of our results. Unfortunately, STRIDE
data is only available through 2004, though Arkes et al. (2008) produced a price series based
on STRIDE price data through 2005.35 I ti st h i sp r i c ed a t at h a tw eu s ei nt h er o b u s t n e s s
check. As an additional robustness check we use the data on U.S. subsidies for PC from
GAO, which is slightly diﬀerent from the ﬁgures reported by the Colombian government
(DNP). Finally, as b, the price elasticity of demand for cocaine at the wholesale level, turns
out to be a crucial parameter in most of the results of the war on illegal drugs (as will
be discussed in detail in the following section), we calibrate the model assuming diﬀerent
values for this parameter from the one obtained in the baseline calibration exercise. In
particular, we calibrate the model assuming b =0 .5,b=1 , and b =1 .5.
Table 4 presents the sources of data that we use in each of the robustness checks as well
as the variations in the reference years for before and after PC and the variations in the
parameter b36.
[Insert Table 4 here: Description of robustness checks]
Table 5 (column 1) reports the average results obtained for each of the parameters
and variables of interest in all the robustness checks as well as the standard deviation
(reported in parenthesis below each average estimate). Column 2 reports the results from
the baseline calibration exercise for comparison. The results using diﬀerent data sources,
years of reference for before and after PC, and variations in b conﬁrm the robustness of
the results obtained in the baseline calibration exercise. All the results are very stable
and the qualitative results are maintained. Namely, that an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies
would imply, under all the robustness checks, that all U.S. subsidies should be allocated to
interdiction eﬀorts.
[Insert Table 5 here: Average results for the robustness checks]
35See Arkes et al. (2008) for details.
36The exact ﬁgures used in each of the rebustness checks are available from the authors upon request.
383.5 Simulations
An important policy question that one can answer within the framework developed in this
paper is, by how much would the cocaine supply decrease if the total budget allocated to
subsidies for the war on drugs in producer countries were increased?. This estimation would
give us a measure of the costs of making “important advances” in the war on drugs, not
only in terms of the monetary costs involved in reducing the amount of cocaine produced
and traﬃcked, but also in terms of the change in the intensity of conﬂict that these policies
might induce. We also study the response of many of the model’s other endogenous variables
to an increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia. In order to
do this, we conduct numerical simulations under the assumption that subsidies to the two
fronts of the war on drugs are allocated eﬃciently. More precisely, we exogenously increase
M (the total U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia) and determine the
response of some of the key variables of the model.
Figures 1, 2, and 3 show the results of the simulations for an exogenous increase in M,
from about $400 million to about $1,500 million, using the calibration results obtained in
t h eb a s e l i n es c e n a r i o .W eﬁnd that an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies still implies (for all
levels of M between $400 million and $1,500 billion) that the entire U.S. budget should be
used to fund the Colombian government’s interdiction eﬀorts and none to fund its conﬂict
with the drug producers over the control of arable land (panel A in Figure 1). While the
fraction of drugs surviving interdiction decreases from about 72.9% to about 59.6%, the
fraction of land under the drug producers’ control stays constant at about 20% (panel
B in Figure 1). The domestic quantity of cocaine slightly increases due to the fact that
no funding is being assigned to ﬁght against production; at the same time, the supply of
cocaine in consumer countries (U.S. and Europe) would decrease from roughly 397,000 kg
to about 332,000 kg (panel C in Figure 1) - that is, if the U.S. budget allocated to the
war on drugs in Colombia is multiplied by a factor of about three, the quantity of cocaine
reaching consumer countries would decrease by about 15%. This implies that the average
cost to the U.S. of decreasing the supply of cocaine by 1 kg is about $15,490. Productivity
per hectare, on the other hand, increases from about 6.67 kg per hectare per year to about
7 . 2 8k gp e rh e c t a r ep e ry e a r( p a n e lDi nF i g u r e1 ) .
The marginal cost to the U.S. of reducing the supply of cocaine by 1 kilogram increases
from about $10,120 per kilogram to about $26,000 per kilogram (panel A in Figure 2),
and the marginal cost to the Colombian government increases from about $2,468 to about
39$3,100 (panel B in Figure 2). Colombian expenses on the war on drugs also increase by
about 32% (panel C in Figure 2), due to the increase in the subsidies granted by the
interested outsider which causes a decrease in the marginal cost to Colombia of investing
resources in interdiction eﬀorts. The sum of the resources invested in the war on drugs by
all the actors involved (our measure for the intensity of conﬂict in equation 72) increases
from slightly less that $4.5 billion to about $8 billion (panel D in Figure 2).
While the wholesale price of a kilogram of cocaine at the border of the average consumer
country increases from $34,090 to about $45,450 (that is, by about 33%), the domestic
price of a kilogram of cocaine only increases by about 2% (panels A and B in Figure 3).
Given that the optimality condition for the U.S. calls for no subsidies to the Colombian
government in its conﬂict over the control of arable land, an increase in the budget increases
producers’ proﬁts but decreases those of the drug traﬃcker (panels C and D in Figure 3).
The increase in producers’ proﬁts is about 12%, whereas the decrease in the drug traﬃcker’s
proﬁts would be about 9%.
[Insert Figures 1 to 3 here].
Summarizing the results obtained from the simulations of an exogenous three-fold in-
crease in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia, we ﬁnd that the
decrease in the supply of cocaine in consumer countries is very small relative to the large
increase in the resources invested in the war on drugs. Although the price of cocaine in
consumer countries increases by about 33%, the amount of cocaine transacted at the whole-
sale level would only decrease by about 15%. This result is explained, at least in part, by
the relatively low elasticity of demand for cocaine that we estimated. The increase in the
budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia also causes an increase in the resources
allocated by the Colombian government to the war on drugs; in general then, it leads to an
intensiﬁcation of the war (in terms of the sum of the resources being invested in the war
by all actors involved). For the Colombian government, the total cost of the war on drugs
increases, as measured by the sum of CT and CP.
Finally, Column 3 in Table 3 summarizes the values that the endogenous variables of
the model would take if the total U.S. budget allocated to PC increases to $1.5 billion.
404D i s c u s s i o n
4.1 Why is it so costly to make “important advances” in the
war on drugs? (Or, why is the war on drugs so ineﬀective?)
This section provides an explanation as for why the war on illegal drug production and
traﬃc k i n gi ss oc o s t l y/i n e ﬀective. We identify the key factors underlying the ineﬀectiveness
of the war on illegal drug production and traﬃcking.
After a few algebraic steps, we are able to express the marginal cost to the interested
outsider of decreasing by 1 kilogram the amount of drugs reaching the consumer country
by subsidizing the producer country’s government in its war against drug producers over

















The last expression implies that the elasticity of Qf with respect to M0, by subsidizing



















We can also express the marginal cost to the interested outsider of decreasing by 1
kilogram the amount of drugs reaching the consumer country by subsidizing producer

















The last expression implies that the elasticity of Qf with respect to Mo, by subsidizing



















41Using the previous expressions, we are able to identify the key factors underlying the
answer to our question, why is it so costly to make important advances in the war against
drugs?
If the marginal costs in expressions 82 and 84 are large (or the elasticities in expressions
83 and 85 are small) then the war on drugs is more costly (less eﬀective).
Given that the key factors driving up the costs are the same factors reducing the elastic-
ities, let us focus on the elasticities,  Ω and  ω. Our numerical results suggest that  Ω >  ω;
that is, at the U.S. current level of expenditures in the war on drugs in Colombia, subsidies
should only be allocated to interdiction eﬀorts. However, both of these elasticities are rel-
atively small. The ﬁrst one,  Ω, is about 0.107, and the second one,  ω, about 0.017, both
assuming an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies to the war on drugs under PC. This implies
that a 10% increase (that is, an increase of about $50 million per year in actual values)
in the U.S. budget allocated to interdiction eﬀorts under PC (the best possible alterna-
tive) would only decrease the supply of cocaine reaching consumer countries by about 1%
(or about 4,000 kg of cocaine); things could get even worse if the subsidies are allocated
ineﬃciently, as in fact seems to have been the case.
So, then, why are these elasticities so small?
Both elasticities depend positively on b, the price elasticity of demand for cocaine at
the wholesale level. If b is low, then the war on drugs tends to become more ineﬀective.
Conversely, if the demand for drugs is relatively elastic, then the war on drugs tends to be
more eﬀective (a higher  Ω and  ω). This ﬁrst key factor, the price elasticity of demand for
illegal drugs, is in line with the conclusion arrived at by Becker et al. (2006). The reason
for this is that, with an inelastic demand function, any attempt to shift the supply of drugs
to the left would only have minor eﬀects on the quantity transacted and a relatively large
eﬀect on prices.
Additionally, the two elasticities depend negatively on φ and γ. If the resources invested
by the government in the conﬂict over the control of arable land with drug producers or
in interdiction eﬀorts against the drug traﬃcker are less eﬃcient (that is, relative to the
resources invested by the drug producers and the drug traﬃcker respectively), then the
responsiveness of Qf to marginal increases in Mo will be lower.
Finally, the two elasticities depend positively on (1−α) and (1−η). These are, respec-
tively, the relative importance of land in the production of illegal drugs and the relative
importance of drug routes in the traﬃcking technology. While we found a relatively high
42value for (1 − η), the value obtained for (1 − α) was relatively low. In other words, while
the war against illegal drug production is mainly a dispute over the control of arable land
- which turns out to be a relatively unimportant factor in the production of cocaine - the
war against illegal drug traﬃcking focuses on the interdiction of drug routes - which turn
out to be relatively quite important in the traﬃcking technology. This diﬀerence in the
relative importance of each of the factors being contested in the two fronts of the war on
drugs is one of the reasons why the optimal allocation of subsidies is in a corner solution.
This is a topic that will be elaborated on more detail in the subsection that follows.
4.2 Why should the U.S. only fund interdiction eﬀorts in Colom-
bia? (And why should Colombia be concerned about it?)
One of the policy recommendations emerging from our analysis and results is that the U.S.
should only be funding interdiction eﬀorts in Colombia. As this result might seem contro-
versial, given the huge emphasis that Colombia and the U.S. have placed on eradication
measures and the conﬂict over the control of arable land, it deserves further analysis. Two
factors are behind this result. First, the elasticity of Qf with respect to M0, by subsidizing
the government’s conﬂict with the drug producer over the control of arable land, is much
lower than the elasticity of Qf with respect to M0, by subsidizing the government’s inter-
diction eﬀorts - that is,  Ω >  ω. It follows then that the U.S. should allocate the resources
devoted to the war on drugs in Colombia where they are more productive - that is, in the
interdiction front of the war on drugs. Second, the war against illegal drug production con-
stitutes a conﬂict over the control of arable land, whereas the interdiction front is a conﬂict
over the fraction of routes controlled by the drug traﬃcker. While land turns out to be
a relatively unimportant factor in the production of cocaine, routes turn out to be a very
important factor in the traﬃcking technology - that is, the war on production represents a
conﬂict over a relatively cheap factor, land, whereas interdiction represents a conﬂict over
a very important and costly factor of production of drug shipments, drug routes.
So why should Colombia be concerned about the U.S. only allocating subsidies to inter-
diction eﬀorts and none to subsidize Colombia in its conﬂict with drug producers over the
c o n t r o lo fa r a b l el a n d ?T h er e a s o ni sv e r ys i m p l e ,t h es u mo ft h et o t a lc o s t st oC o l o m b i a
from illegal drug production and traﬃcking is lower under the current, relatively ineﬃcient
allocation of subsidies, than under an eﬃcient allocation (from the U.S. perspective). The
43reason for this is that, although the income derived by drug producers, PdQd, is much lower
than the income derived by the drug traﬃcker, PfQf,c 1 is much higher than c2; the dif-
ference between these two costs to Colombia more than counteracts the diﬀerence between
the respective incomes of drug producers and the drug traﬃcker. Thus, Colombia is better
oﬀ then under the current ineﬃcient allocation of subsidies by the U.S. to PC. Costs c1
and c2 are important to the U.S. only to the extent that they induce Colombia to ﬁght
harder against drug producers and against drug traﬃckers, respectively. However, if the
U.S. were to stop subsidizing Colombia in its war against drug producers over the control
of arable land, drug production would increase, the income of drug producers would go up
and, thus, the cost facing Colombia from this activity would increase. In fact, our results
suggest that under an eﬃcient allocation of subsidies, the total cost (including the costs of
ﬁghting in each of the fronts of the war on drugs) from illegal drug production would go
down by about $4 million, whereas the total cost from illegal drug traﬃcking would go up
by about $27 million. As a result, the sum of these two costs to Colombia would increase
i ft h es u b s i d i e st ot h et w of r o n t so ft h ew a ro nd r u g sw e r ea l l o c a t e de ﬃciently.
In the appendix we explore the optimal allocation of subsidies that Colombia would
implement if it were allowed to choose the allocation of the U.S. budget between the two
fronts of the war on drugs. We ﬁnd the conditions for the optimal allocation of subsidies
from the Colombian perspective, whose objective is not to minimize the amount of cocaine
reaching consumer countries but, rather, to minimize the total costs from illegal drug
production and traﬃcking, and the costs of ﬁghting the war. When we calibrate the model
with the optimality conditions for Colombia, we ﬁnd that Colombia would choose to allocate
the total U.S. budget to subsidizing its conﬂict with the drug producers over the control of
arable land. The main driving force behind this result is that Colombia faces a much larger
cost at the margin from illegal drug production than from illegal drug traﬃcking. Despite
the fact that: i) the relative eﬃciency of the resources invested by Colombia and the U.S.
in the conﬂict over the control of arable land is much lower than the relative eﬃciency
of the resources invested in interdiction eﬀorts; and ii) the conﬂict with drug producers
targets a relatively unimportant factor of production whereas interdiction eﬀorts target a
relatively important factor, Colombia would still prefer to allocate all the U.S. subsidies to
ﬁght against illegal drug production because the marginal cost perceived by Colombia from
this activity is much larger than the marginal cost from illegal drug traﬃcking activities.
445 Concluding Remarks
Modelling the motivations and choices of the actors involved in the war on drugs using
economic tools (more precisely, game theory tools) is an important step towards better
understanding the observed outcomes and future prospects of this apparently-ineﬀective
war.
In this paper, we developed a game-theory model of the war against illegal drug pro-
duction and traﬃcking, and use the available evidence from the cocaine market as well as
the stylized facts of the war on drugs in Colombia in order to calibrate all the unobservable
parameters of the model. Importantly, we are thus able to estimate important variables
that are key for evaluating the eﬀectiveness, eﬃciency, and costs of the war on drugs in
Colombia, as well as its future prospects. The paper provides estimates for a wide range of
parameters that are key to understanding the outcomes of the war on drugs - for instance,
the value of the price elasticity of demand, which, in line with the results of Becker et
al. (2006), is a key parameter for understanding the response of market outcomes to an
increase in the budget allocated to the war on drugs. The paper also provides estimates for
the marginal cost of decreasing the production and traﬃcking of cocaine by one kilogram,
the allocation of resources to the war on drugs by the diﬀerent actors involved, the intensity
of conﬂict, and the rates of return associated with illegal drug production and traﬃcking,
among others.
By means of a simulation exercise, the paper also provides an analysis of the eﬀects of
increasing the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia. In particular, we
ﬁnd that a three-fold increase in the U.S. budget allocated to the war on drugs in Colombia
would only decrease the supply of cocaine that successfully reaches the consumer countries
by about 15%, with an average cost to the U.S. of decreasing the exportation of cocaine
by one kilogram of about $15,490.
The framework developed in this paper, as well as the estimates of key variables, should
help policy makers objectively evaluate current anti-drug policies and, hopefully, guide
them in the process of shaping more sound strategies in the war on illegal drugs.
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47Appendix
· Solution to the drug market equilibrium (in the producer and consumer
countries).
Solving equations 35 and 36, the equilibrium price of drugs in the producer country, Pd,
in the consumer country, Pf, and the corresponding drug quantities in the producing and














































The corresponding equilibrium quantities transacted in the producer and consumer

































· Parameters of the Interested Outsider’s total expenses in the war on drugs
(equation 38):
Γ =
(1 − α)(η − bη)
b + αη − bαη
,ψ =
(1 − b)(1 − η)
























· Parameters of equilibrium quantity of drugs that is successfully produced
and exported in equilibrium (equation 39):
ζ =
bη(1 − α)
b + αη − bαη
,χ=
b(1 − η)








· The problem for Colombia if it were allowed to choose the allocation of
U.S. subsidies between the two fronts of the war on drugs:


















c2 + γ(1 − η)
.
W ea s s u m et h a tC o l o m b i at a k e sp r i c e sa sg i v e n .


















This optimality condition says that the marginal cost of reducing Colombia’s objective
function by increasing the subsidies for interdiction eﬀorts must be equal to the marginal
cost of reducing Colombia’s objective function by increasing the subsidies for the conﬂict


















































































































































2h(1 + Θ) − 2Θ − 1











2q∗(1 + Γ) − 2Γ − 1
2 − 2q∗ . (102)
When we calibrate the model using the optimality condition on equation 88 and the ex-

















0.78. This implies that in order to minimize its objective function, Colombia would choose
a smaller subsidy for interdiction and a larger one for the conﬂict over the control of arable
land. In fact, we obtain a corner solution with q∗ =0 .144 and h∗ =0 .87 (the maxi-
mum value this variable can take), which implies that ω∗
COL =0 .44 and Ω∗


















Should Colombia be allowed to choose the allocation of U.S. subsidies to to the two
fronts of the war on drugs under PC, it would choose to allocate all the U.S. budget to
subsidizing its conﬂict against the drug producers over the control of arable land.
50Table 1: Data used in the baseline calibration exercise.
Label Source Before PC After PC
Average 98-99-00 Average 04-05-06
Final Price in Consumer Countries Pf UNODC $39,815 $33,815
Final Price in US Pf;U:S UNODC $37,133 $25,067
Domestic Price Pd UNODC $1,516 $1,777
Final Supply from Colombia Qf 570,078 kg. 398,789 kg.
Domestic Potential Production Qd UNODC 688,840 kg. 630,075 kg.
Hectares with cocaine qL UNODC 161,700 has. 81,300 has.
Productivity per Hectare UNODC 4.26 kg/ha/year. 7.75 kg/ha/year.
Percentage of Land with Cocaine Crops q UNODC 32.3% 16.3%
Seizures by Colombian Authorities UNODC 77,466 kg. 166,247 kg.
Colombian Cociane Seized in Transit 41,298 kg. 65,039 kg.
Percentage Not Seized h UNODC 88.7% 73.6%
Seizures in Source Countries UNODC 93,828 kg. 191,675 kg.
Seizures in Transit Countries UNODC 63,078 kg. 111,990 kg.
Colombia Expenses Ms DNP $420 Million $567 Million
(Assuming a 35% increase)
USA Expenses Mo DNP 0 $465 Million
Cocaine Flowing to US Markets GAO 391,000 kg. 530,000 kg.
Supply in US 327,922 kg. 418,010 kg.
UNODC: United Nations Oce on Drugs and Crime
DNP: Departamento Nacional de Planeacin, Colombia.
Data without a source is calculated by the authors.Table 2: Calibration results for the baseline exercise
Parameter Value Description

 0.35 Percentage of interdiction expenditure made by Colombia.
! 0.79 Percentage of erradication expenditure made by Colombia.
 519,746 Scale parameter of the tracking technology.
 0.08 Relative importance of domestic drugs in the tracking technology.
a 262,325,583 Scale parameter of the demand.
b 0.62 Price elasticity of the dealers demand.
 0.79 Relative importance of complementary factors to land in production.
 0.005 Scale parameter of production technology.
c1 0.39 Net cost per unit of income obtained by drug producers.
c2 0.06 Net cost per unit of income obtained by drug trackers.
 1.82 Relative eectiveness of producers in the conict for land.
 0.48 Relative eectiveness of trackers in the conict for routes.Table 3: Calibration results for dierent allocations of subsidies.
Variable Actual Ecient Allocation Ecient Allocation
(!, 
 for M = 0:46b ) (!, 
 for M = 1:5b )
! 0.79 1 1

 0.35 0.32 0.18
q 0.162 0.19 0.19
h 0.74 0.72 0.60
CMq $86,279 $68,376 $90,730
CMh $9,788 $11,161 $25,964
Qf 398,789 kg. 390.663 kg. 332.204kg.
Pf $33,815 $34,961 $45,452
Qd 630,075 kg. 662,707 kg. 717,382 kg.
Pd $1,777 $1711 $1748
t $3,263 m. $3,550 m. $5,592 m
s $570 m. $684 m. $1,845 m.
x $24 m $23 m. $26 m.
y $59 m. $59 m. $66 m.
z $231 m. $178 m. $196 m.
r $ 442 m. $448 m. $495 m.
P $34 m. $36 m. $39 m.
T $9,103 m. $8,974 m. $8,254 m.
MCol $567 m. $574 m. $737 m.
CMCol;q $11,518 $14,245 $18,711
CMCol;h $2,478 $2,518 $3,114
CP $802 m. $797 m. $881 m.
CT $964 m. $992 m. $1,199 m.
IC $4,461 m. $4,756 m. $8,014 m.
Land Productivity 7.75 kg/ha/year 6.72 kg/ha/year 7.28 kg/ha/year
Production Returns 6.49% 6.7% 6.7%


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Table 5: Average results for the robustness checks.
Parameter Average of all Baseline









































































Qf reduction as M increases
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